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Abstract—Model extraction allows an adversary to steal a copy
of a remotely deployed machine learning model given access to its
predictions. Adversaries are motivated to mount such attacks for
a variety of reasons, ranging from reducing their computational
costs, to eliminating the need to collect expensive training data, to
obtaining a copy of a model in order to find adversarial examples,
perform membership inference, or model inversion attacks.
In this paper, we taxonomize the space of model extraction
attacks around two objectives: accuracy, i.e., performing well
on the underlying learning task, and fidelity, i.e., matching the
predictions of the remote victim classifier on any input.
To extract a high-accuracy model, we develop a learning-based
attack which exploits the victim to supervise the training of an ex-
tracted model. Through analytical and empirical arguments, we
then explain the inherent limitations that prevent any learning-
based strategy from extracting a truly high-fidelity model—i.e.,
extracting a functionally-equivalent model whose predictions are
identical to those of the victim model on all possible inputs.
Addressing these limitations, we expand on prior work to develop
the first practical functionally-equivalent extraction attack for
direct extraction (i.e., without training) of a model’s weights.
We perform experiments both on academic datasets and a
state-of-the-art image classifier trained with 1 billion proprietary
images. In addition to broadening the scope of model extraction
research, our work demonstrates the practicality of model ex-
traction attacks against production-grade systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning, and neural networks in particular, are
widely deployed in industry settings. Models are often de-
ployed as prediction services or otherwise exposed to potential
adversaries. Despite this fact, the trained models themselves
are often proprietary and are closely guarded.
There are two reasons models are often seen as sensitive.
First, they are expensive to obtain. Not only is it expensive
to train the final model [1] (e.g., NVIDIA recently trained
a model with 8 billion parameters on hardware costing 36
million dollars [2]), performing the work to identify the
optimal set of model architecture, training algorithm, and
hyper-parameters often eclipses the cost of training the final
model. Further, training these models also requires investing
in expensive collection process to obtain the training datasets
necessary to obtain an accurate classifier [3–6]. Second, there
are security [7, 8] and privacy [9, 10] concerns for revealing
trained models to potential adversaries.
Concerningly, prior work found that an adversary with query
access to a model can steal the model to obtain a copy that
largely agrees with the remote victim models [8,11–16]. These
extraction attacks are therefore important to consider.
In this paper, we systematize the space of model extraction
around two adversarial objectives: accuracy and fidelity. Ac-
curacy measures the correctness of predictions made by the
extracted model on the test distribution. Fidelity, in contrast,
measures the general agreement between the extracted and
victim models on any input. Observe that these two objectives
are in conflict for imperfect victim models: a high-fidelity
extraction should replicate the errors of the victim, whereas
a high-accuracy model should instead try to make an accurate
prediction. At the high-fidelity limit is functionally-equivalent
model extraction: the two models agree on all inputs, both on
and off the underlying data distribution.
While most prior work considers accuracy [7, 11, 13], we
argue that fidelity is often equally important. When using
model extraction to mount black-box adversarial example
attacks [7], fidelity ensures the attack is more effective because
more adversarial examples transfer from the extracted model
to the victim. Membership inference [9, 10] benefits from the
extracted model closely replicating the confidence of predic-
tions made by the victim. Finally, a functionally-equivalent
extraction enables the adversary to inspect whether internal
representations reveal unintended attributes of the input—
that are statistically uncorrelated with the training objective,
enabling the adversary to benefit from overlearning [17].
We design two attacks. First, a learning-based attack, which
uses the victim to generate labels for training the extracted
model. While existing techniques already achieve high ac-
curacy, our attacks are over 16x more query-efficient and
scale to large models. We perform experiments that surface
inherent limitations of learning-based extraction attacks and
argue that learning-based strategies are ill-suited to achieve
high-fidelity extraction. Then, the first practical functionally-
equivalent attack, which directly recovers a two-layer neural
network’s weights exactly given access to double-precision
model inference. Compared to prior work, which required a
high-precision power side-channel [18] or access to model
gradients [19], our attack only requires input-output access
to the model, while simultaneously scaling to larger networks.
We make the following contributions:
• We taxonomize the space of model extraction attacks by
exploring the objective of accuracy and fidelity.
• We significantly improve the query efficiency of learning-
based attacks and make them practical for millions-of-
parameter models trained on billions of images.
• We achieve high-fidelity extraction by developing the first
practical functionally-equivalent model extraction attack.
• We mix the proposed methods to obtain a hybrid method
which improves both accuracy and fidelity extraction.
• We discuss mitigation strategies for model extraction.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
For n ∈ Z, we write [n] = {1, 2, . . . n}. We consider
classifiers with domain X ⊆ Rd and range Y ⊆ RK ; the
output of the classifier is a distribution over K class labels.
For a classifier f , the class assigned to an input x by f is
arg maxi∈[K] f(x)i. In order to satisfy the constraint that a
classifier’s output is a distribution, a softmax σ(·) is typically
applied to the output of an arbitrary function fL : X → RK :
σ(fL(x))i =
exp(fL(x)i)∑
j exp(fL(x)j)
.
We call the function fL(·) the logit function for a classifier f .
To convert a class label into a probability vector, it is common
to use one-hot encoding: for a value j ∈ [K], the one-hot
encoding OH(j;K) is a vector in RK with OH(j;K)i =
1(i = j)—that is, it is 1 only at index j, and 0 elsewhere.
Model extraction concerns reproducing a victim model,
or oracle, which we write O(·) : X → Y . The model
extraction adversary will run an extraction algorithm A(O),
which outputs the extracted model Oˆ(·). We will sometimes
parameterize the oracle (resp. extracted model) as Oθ (resp.
Oˆθ) to denote that it has model parameters θ—we will omit
this when unnecessary or apparent from context.
In this work, we consider O(·) and Oˆ(·) to both
be neural networks. A neural network is a sequence of
operations—alternatingly applying linear operations and non-
linear operations—a pair of linear and non-linear operations
is called a layer. Each linear operation projects onto some
space Rh—the dimensionality h of this space is referred
to as the width of the layer. The number of layers is the
depth of the network. The non-linear operations are typically
fixed, while the linear operations have parameters which are
learned during training. The function computed by layer i,
fi(a), is therefore computed as fi(a) = gi(A(i)a + B(i)),
where gi is the ith non-linear function, and A(i), B(i) are the
parameters of layer i (A(i) is the weights, B(i) the biases).
A common choice of activation is the rectified linear unit,
or ReLU, which sets ReLU(x) = max(0, x). Introduced
to improve the convergence of optimization when training
neural networks, the ReLU activation has established itself
as an effective default choice for practitioners [20]. Thus, we
consider primarily ReLU networks in this work.
The network structure described here is called fully con-
nected because each linear operation “connects” every input
node to every output node. In many domains, such as computer
vision, this is more structure than necessary. If a neuron
learns an edge detector, for example, it only needs to use
information in a small region of the input space, not the whole
scene. Convolutional networks were developed to combat this
inefficiency—the linear functions become filters, which are
still linear, but are only applied to a small (say 3x3 or 5x5)
window of the input. They are applied in turn to every such
window using the same weights, making convolutions require
much fewer parameters than fully connected networks.
Neural networks are trained by empirical risk minimization
(ERM). Given a dataset of n samples D = {xi, yi}ni=1,
which is a multiset of elements from X ×Y , training involves
minimizing a loss function L on the dataset with respect to the
network parameters of the network f . A common loss function
is the cross-entropy loss H for a sample (x, y):
H(y, f(x)) = −
∑
k∈[K]
yk log(f(x)k),
where y is the probability (or one-hot) vector for the true class.
The cross-entropy loss on the full dataset is then
L(D; f) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(yi, f(xi)).
The loss is minimized with some form of gradient descent.
The most basic optimizer is stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
In SGD, gradients of the model parameters θ are computed
over a batch B containing b samples, averaged, and scaled by
a learning rate η:
θt+1 = θt − η
b
∑
i∈B
∇θH(yi, f(xi)).
Other optimizers exist [21–23] which use gradient statistics to
reduce the variance of updates.
A less common setting, but one which is important for
our work, is when the target values y which are used to
train the network are not one-hot values, but are probability
vectors output by a different model g(x). When training using
the dataset Dg = {xi, g(xi)}ni=1, we say the trained model
is distilled from g, referring to the process of distillation
introduced in Hinton et al. [24].
III. TAXONOMY OF THREAT MODELS
We now address the spectrum of adversaries interested
in extracting neural networks. As illustrated in Table I, we
taxonomize the space of possible adversaries around two
overarching goals—theft and reconnaissance. We detail why
extraction is not always practically realizable through the ana-
lytical construction of models that are impossible to extract, or
require a large number of queries to extract. We conclude our
threat model with a discussion of how adversarial capabilities
(e.g., prior knowledge of the model’s architecture or how much
information is returned by queries made to the model) affect
the strategies an adversary may consider.
A. Adversarial Motivations
Model extraction attacks target the confidentiality of a vic-
tim model deployed on a remote service. By model, we refer
here to both the architecture and its parameters. Architectural
details include the learning hypothesis (i.e., neural network
in our case) and corresponding details (e.g., number of layers
and activation functions for neural networks). Parameter values
are the result of training. The adversary may be interested in
violating the model’s confidentiality for several reasons falling
under two broad classes: theft and reconnaissance.
Generally, the defender went through an expensive process
to design the model’s architecture and train it to set parameter
values. This drives the first class of attacks where theft
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Attack Type Model type Goal Query Output
Lowd & Meek [8] Direct Recovery Linear models Functionally Equivalent Labels
Tramer et al. [11] (Active) Learning Linear models, neural networks Task Accuracy, Fidelity Probabilities, labels
Tramer et al. [11] Path finding Decision trees Functionally Equivalent Probabilities, labels
Milli et al. [19] (theoretical) Direct Recovery Neural network (2 layer) Functionally Equivalent Gradients, logits
Milli et al. [19] Learning Linear model, neural network Task Accuracy Gradients
Pal et al. [15] Active learning Neural network Fidelity Probabilities, labels
Chandrasekharan et al. [13] Active learning Linear models Functionally Equivalent Labels
Copycat CNN [16] Learning Convolutional neural network Task Accuracy, Fidelity Labels
Papernot et al. [7] Active learning Neural network Fidelity Labels
CSI NN [25] Direct Recovery Neural network Functionally Equivalent Power Side Channel
Knockoff Nets [12] Learning Neural network Task Accuracy Probabilities
Functionally equivalent (this work) Direct Recovery Neural network (2 layer) Functionally Equivalent Probabilities, logits
Efficient learning (this work) Learning Neural network Task Accuracy, Fidelity Probabilities
TABLE I
EXISTING MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS
adversaries are motivated by economic incentives. Here, the
model can be viewed as intellectual property that the adversary
is trying to steal. A line of work has in fact referred to this as
“model stealing” [11].
In the latter class of attacks, the adversary may be per-
forming reconnaissance to later mount attacks targeting other
security properties of the learning system: e.g., its integrity
with adversarial examples [7], or privacy with training data
membership inference [9, 10]. In particular, model extraction
enables an adversary previously operating in a black-box threat
model to mount attacks against the extracted model in a white-
box threat model because the adversary has—by design—
access to the extracted model’s parameters. In the limit, an
adversary motivated by reconnaissance would expect to extract
an exact copy of the oracle.
The goal of exact extraction is to produce Oˆθ = Oθ—that
is, the model architecture as well as all of its weights should be
identical. This definition is presented purely as a strawman—
it is the strongest possible attack one could want, but it is
fundamentally impossible for many classes of neural networks.
Take the example of ReLU networks. It is easy to, given a
ReLU network, construct an equivalence class of networks
which are indistinguishable from input-output behavior. To do
so, we can pick any neuron, and scale its incoming weights
and biases by some c > 0, and scale its outgoing weights
and biases by c−1. Alternatively, for any hidden layer, it is
possible to permute its neurons or even add a dead neuron—
that is, a neuron whose output is always zero—both of which
are unobservable from input-output relationships. From these
examples, we can see that exact extraction cannot be done—
the best we can do is identify the equivalence class the oracle
belongs to.
B. Adversarial Goals
This perspective yields a natural spectrum of realistic ad-
versarial goals characterizing decreasingly precise extractions.
a) Functionally Equivalent Extraction: The goal of
functionally equivalent extraction is to construct an Oˆ such
that ∀x ∈ X , Oˆ(x) = O(x). This is a tractable weakening of
the exact extraction definition from earlier—it is the hardest
possible goal given observation of input-output pairs only. The
adversary obtains a member of the equivalence class the oracle
belongs to. This extraction enables a number of downstream
attacks, including those like overlearning [17]—that involve an
inspection of the model’s internal representations, to operate
in the white-box threat model.
b) Fidelity Extraction: Given some target distribution
DF over X , and goal similarity function S(p1, p2), the
goal of fidelity extraction is to construct an Oˆ that maxi-
mizes Prx∼DF
[
S(Oˆ(x),O(x))
]
. In this work, we consider
only label agreement, where S(p1, p2) = 1(arg max(p1) =
arg max(p2)); we leave exploration of other similarity func-
tions to future work.
A natural distribution of interest DF is the data distribution
itself—the adversary wants to make sure the mistakes and
correct classifications are the same between the two models.
A reconnaissance attack for constructing adversarial examples
would use as its distribution a perturbed data distribution;
mistakes might be more important to the adversary in this
setting. Membership inference would use the natural data
distribution, including any outliers. These distributions tend to
be concentrated on a low-dimension manifold of X , making
fidelity extraction significantly easier than functionally equiv-
alent extraction. Indeed, functionally equivalent extraction
achieves a perfect fidelity of 1 on all distributions and all
distance functions.
c) Task Accuracy Extraction: For the true task
distribution DA over X × Y , the goal of task ac-
curacy extraction is to construct an Oˆ maximizing
Pr(x,y)∼DA
[
arg max(Oˆ(x)) = y
]
. This goal is to match (or
exceed) the accuracy of the target model, which is the easiest
goal to consider in this taxonomy (because it doesn’t need to
match the mistakes of O).
C. Model Extraction is Hard
Before we consider adversarial capabilities in Section III-D
and potential corresponding approaches to model extraction,
we must understand how successful we can hope to be. Here,
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Fig. 1. An illustration of fidelity and accuracy. The solid blue line is the
oracle: functionally identical extraction would recover this line precisely. The
green dash-dot line achieves perfect label fidelity: it matches the oracle’s
predictions on all data. The orange dashed line achieves perfect accuracy: it
classifies all points correctly. Fidelity with label agreement on the test distribu-
tion and task accuracy extraction differ on points the oracle misclassifies. Note
that we used label agreement to measure fidelity. If we had instead measured
fidelity as a distance between the oracle and extracted model’s outputs, the
green dash-dot line may not achieve perfect fidelity.
we present arguments that will serve to bound our expecta-
tions. First, we will identify some limitations of functionally
equivalent extraction by constructing networks which can
require arbitrarily many queries to extract. Second, we will
present another class of networks that cannot be extracted with
fidelity without querying an exponential number of times in
its depth. We provide intuition in this section and later prove
these statements in Appendix A.
1) Functionally equivalent extraction can require expo-
nentially many queries: In order to show that functionally
equivalent extraction is intractable in the worst case, we
provide a construction of a class of neural networks that are
hard to extract without making exponentially many queries in
the network’s width.
Theorem 1. There exists a class of width 3k and depth 2
neural networks on domain [0, 1]d with d ≥ c that require
256k queries to extract.
It is in fact possible to make the value of 256 larger—this
particular value reflects an 8-bit pixel value range in image
classification domains. The intuition for this theorem is that a
width 3k network can implement a function that only returns
a non-zero value on at most a 256−k fraction of the space. In
the worst case, 256k queries are necessary to find this fraction
of the space.
Note that this result assumes the adversary is only allowed
to observe the input-output query behavior of the oracle. If this
assumption is broken then functionally equivalent extraction
becomes practical. For example, Batina et al. [25] perform
functionally equivalent extraction by performing a side chan-
nel attack (specifically, differential power analysis [26]) on a
microprocessor evaluating the neural network.
We also observe in Theorem 2 that, given white-box access
to two neural networks, it is NP-hard in general to test if
they are functionally equivalent. We do this by embedding a
subset sum instance into a neural network, so that it is nonzero
only on an input corresponding to a satisfying subset, and 0
elsewhere. Then finding a nonzero location in this network is
as hard as finding a satisfying subset.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Given the weights of two neural
networks, testing whether they are functionally equivalent is
NP-hard.
Any attack which can claim to perform functionally equiva-
lent extraction efficiently (both in number of queries used and
in running time) must make some assumptions to avoid these
pathologies. Later, when we present a functionally equivalent
extraction attack for two-layer neural network models, we
will be clear how its assumptions allow us to recover the
functionally equivalent model.
2) Learning approaches struggle with fidelity extraction:
A final difficulty for model extraction comes from recent
work in learnability [27]. Das et al. prove that, for deep
random networks with input dimension d and depth h, model
extraction approaches that can be written as Statistical Query
(SQ) learning algorithms require exp(O(h)) samples for distri-
butional extraction. Statistical query algorithms are a restricted
form of learning algorithm which only allows access to the
data with noisy aggregate statistics; many prevalent learning
algorithms, such as (stochastic) gradient descent and PCA,
are examples. As a result, most learning-based approaches
to model extraction will inherit this inefficiency. A sample-
efficient approach therefore must either make assumptions
about the model to be extracted (to distinguish it from a deep
random network), or must access its dataset in nonuniform
ways, avoiding statistical queries.
Theorem 3 (Informal [27]). Random networks with domain
{0, 1}d and range {0, 1} and depth h require exp(O(h))
samples to learn in the SQ learning model.
D. Adversarial Capabilities
Adversaries may have varying levels of prior knowledge
about the oracle and the data used to train it. These can
be organized into three broad categories—domain knowledge,
deployment knowledge, and model access.
1) Domain Knowledge: Limiting the adversary’s domain
knowledge is a strong assumption, and so adversaries should
be assumed to have as much domain knowledge as the oracle’s
designer. Domain knowledge characterizes what the adversary
knows about the task the model was designed for. For example,
if the model is an image classifier, then the model should
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predict similarly under standard image data augmentations,
such as shifts, rotations, or crops.
In certain cases, the adversary can also be assumed to have
access to public pretrained models or public datasets relevant
to the task of interest. This is often the case for learning-
based model extraction, which we develop in Section IV. We
consider an adversary using part of a public dataset of 1.3
million images [4] as unlabeled data to mount an attack against
a model trained on a proprietary dataset consisting of 1 billion
labeled images [28].
a) Learning-based extraction is hard without natural
data: When performing learning-based extractions, we assume
that the adversary is able to collect public unlabeled data
to mount their attack. For a theft-motivated adversary who
wishes to steal the oracle for local use, this is a natural
assumption—this adversary has data they want to learn the
labels of without querying the model. For other adversaries,
progress in generative modeling is likely to offer ways to
remove this assumption [29]. We leave this to future work
because our overarching aim in this paper is to characterize the
model extraction attacker space around the notions of accuracy
and fidelity. All progress achieved by our approaches is com-
plementary to possible progress in synthetic data generation.
2) Deployment Knowledge: Deployment knowledge char-
acterizes what the adversary knows about the oracle itself. This
includes the precise model architecture, training procedure,
and the model’s training dataset. The adversary may have
access to public artifacts of the oracle—a distilled version of
the oracle may be available (such as for OpenAI GPT [30]) or
the oracle may be transfer learned from a public pretrained
model (as is the case for many image classifiers [31] or
language models like BERT [32]).
In addition, the adversary may or may not have access to
the feature and label sets. That is, the features that make
up the inputs of the model and the classes the model may
output. While the latter can generally be inferred by interacting
with the model (e.g., making queries and observing the labels
predicted by the model), the former is generally more difficult
to infer. While our preliminary investigations suggest that these
are not limiting assumptions, we leave proper treatment of this
aspect to future work.
3) Model Access: Model access characterizes what infor-
mation the adversary obtains from the oracle. For example, the
adversary may have a bound on the number of queries they can
make. They may also require different strategies depending on
whether queries are answered with:
• label: only the label of the most-likely class is revealed.
• label and score: in addition to the most-likely label, the
confidence score of the model in its prediction for this
label is revealed.
• top-k scores: the labels and confidence scores for the k
classes whose confidence are highest are revealed.
• scores: confidence scores for all labels are revealed.
• logits: raw logit values for all labels are revealed.
In general, the more access an adversary is given, the more
effective they should be in accomplishing their goal. We
instantiate practical attacks under several of these assumptions.
We also discuss model access in more details in Section VIII
where we detail potential defensive strategies to limit adver-
sarial access to the model effectively while preserving quality
of service for legitimate users.
IV. LEARNING-BASED MODEL EXTRACTION
We present our first attack strategy where the victim model
serves as a labeling oracle for the adversary. While many
attack variants exist [7, 11], they generally stage an iterative
interaction between the adversary and the oracle, where the
adversary collects labels for a set of points from the oracle
and uses them as a training set for the extracted model.
Here, we realistically simulate large-scale model extraction
by considering an oracle that was trained on 1 billion Insta-
gram images [28] to obtain (at the time of the experiment)
state-of-the-art performance on the standard image classifica-
tion benchmark, ImageNet [4]. The oracle, with 193 million
parameters, obtained 84.2% top-1 accuracy and 97.2% top-
5 accuracy on the 1000-class benchmark—we will refer to
the model as the ”WSL model”, abbreviating the paper title.
We give the adversary access to the public ImageNet dataset.
The adversary’s goal is to use the WSL model as a labeling
oracle to train an ImageNet classifier that performs better than
if we trained the model directly on ImageNet. The attack is
successful if access to the WSL model—trained on 1 billion
proprietary images inaccessible to the adversary—enables the
adversary to extract a model that outperforms a baseline
model trained directly with ImageNet labels.
We consider two variants of the attack: one where the
adversary selects 10% of the training set (i.e., about 130,000
points) and the other where the adversary keeps the entire
training set (i.e., about 1.3 million points). To put this number
in perspective, recall that each image has a dimension of
224x224 pixels, where each pixel color is encoded with three
channels, hence bringing the number of model input features
to 224 · 224 · 3 = 150, 528 features. Each image belongs to
one of 1,000 categories. Although ImageNet data is labeled,
we always treat it as unlabeled to simulate a realistic adversary.
A. Fully-supervised model extraction
This first attack is fully supervised. It serves both as an
experiment to validate our hypothesis that labels returned by
the oracle are more informative than dataset labels, and also
as a way for us to compare our subsequent attacks with prior
work which employed fully-supervised extraction.
The adversary needs to obtain a label for each of the
points it intends to train the extracted model with. The oracle
is thus queried to label the adversary’s training points with
the oracle’s predictions. The oracle reveals its full prediction
vector (i.e., labels and scores in the threat model from Sec-
tion III) when queried. This assumption is challenged later
in Section VIII, where we show that the adversary is not
significantly weakened when it only has access to the top-5
label predictions and scores.
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Readers familiar with knowledge transfer will note that this
process follows closely the one of distillation [24]. In fact, one
of the innovations of our attack is to simulate1 the temperature
parameter—central to distillation—as a means to control how
much weight is placed on the runner-up classes when training
our victim model. Specifically, we post-process the oracle’s
response O(x) to form the following training label OT (x):
OT (x)i = O(x)
1/T
i∑
j O(x)1/Tj
(1)
The adversary then trains its model to match these labels
using the cross-entropy loss. We used T = 1.5 in our
experiments after a random search. Our experiments use two
architectures known to perform well on image classification:
ResNet-v2-50 and ResNet-v2-200.
Results. We present results in Table II. For instance, the
adversary is able to improve the accuracy of their model by
1.0% for ResNetv2-50 and 1.9% for ResNet v2 200 after
having queried the oracle for 10% of the ImageNet data.
Recall that the task has 1,000 labels, making these increases
significant. The gains we are able to achieve as an adversary
are in line with progress that has been made by the computer
vision community on the ImageNet benchmark over the last
years, where each year the research community improved the
state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy by about a single percent point.2
B. Improving query efficiency with unlabeled data
For adversaries interested in theft, a learning-based strategy
should minimize the number of queries required to achieve a
given level of accuracy. A natural approach towards this end is
to take advantage of advances in label-efficient ML, including
active learning [35] and semi-supervised learning [36].
Active learning allows a learner to query the labels of
arbitrary points—the goals is to query the best set of points
to learn a model with. Semi-supervised learning considers
a learner with some labeled data, but much more unlabeled
data—the learner seeks to leverage the unlabeled data (without
labeling it) to improve performance on the classification task.
The connection between label-efficient learning and
learning-based model extraction attacks is not new [11,13,15],
but has focused on active learning approaches. We demonstrate
that, given the assumption of unlabeled task-specific data,
semi-supervised learning is also an effective approach to im-
proving model extraction attacks. We explore two techniques:
the rotation loss [34] and MixMatch [37].
Rotation loss. We leverage the current state-of-the-art semi-
supervised learning approach on ImageNet, which augments
the model with a rotation loss [34]. An extra linear classifier
is added on top of the final-layer representation. The goal
of this extra function is to predict the rotation applied to an
1We can’t follow the distillation procedure from [24] exactly because we
have access to the output probabilities of the oracle rather than its logits,
making it impossible to directly control the softmax temperature.
2https://paperswithcode.com/sota/image-classification-on-imagenet
input—each input is fed in four times per batch, rotated by
{0◦, 90◦, 180◦, 270◦}. The classifier should output one-hot en-
codings {OH(0; 4), OH(1; 4), OH(2; 4), OH(3; 4)}, respec-
tively, for these rotated images. Then, the loss is written as:
LR(X; fθ) =
1
4N
N∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
H(fθ(Rj(xi)), j)
where Rj is the jth rotation, H is cross-entropy loss, and fθ
is the model’s probability outputs for the rotation task. Inputs
need not be labeled, hence we compute this loss on unlabeled
data for which the adversary did not query the model.
We compare the accuracy of models trained with the rotation
loss on data labeled by the oracle and data with ImageNet
labels. Our best performing extracted model, with an accuracy
of 64.5%, is trained with the rotation loss on oracle labels
whereas the baseline on ImageNet labels only achieves 62.5%
accuracy with the rotation loss and 61.2% without the rotation
loss. This demonstrates the cumulative benefit of adding a
rotation loss to the objective and training on oracle labels for
a theft-motivated adversary.
We note that as semi-supervised learning techniques on
ImageNet mature, further gains should be reflected in the
performance of model extraction attacks.
MixMatch. To validate this hypothesis, we turn to smaller
scale datasets where semi-supervised learning has already
made significant progress. We investigate a technique called
MixMatch [37] on two datasets: SVHN [38] and CI-
FAR10 [39].
For both datasets, inputs are color images of 32x32 pixels
that need to be classified in 10 classes. The training set of
SVHN contains 73257 images (50000 for CIFAR10) and the
test set contains 26032 images (10000 for CIFAR10). We train
the oracle with a WideResNet-28-2 architecture on the labeled
training set. This achieves 97.36% accuracy on SVHN and
95.75% accuracy on CIFAR10.
The adversary is given access to the same training set but
without knowledge of the labels. Our goal is to validate the
effectiveness of semi-supervised learning by demonstrating
that the adversary only needs to query the oracle on a small
subset of these training points to extract a model whose
accuracy on the task is comparable to the oracle’s. To this
end, we run 5 trials of fully supervised extraction (no use of
unlabeled data), and 5 trials of MixMatch, reporting for each
trial the median accuracy of the 20 latest checkpoints, as done
in [37].
Results. With only 250 queries (293x smaller label set than
the SVHN oracle and 200x smaller for CIFAR10), MixMatch
reaches 95.82% test accuracy on SVHN and 87.98% accuracy
on CIFAR10. This is higher than fully supervised training that
uses 4000 queries. With 4000 queries, MixMatch is within
0.29% of the accuracy of the oracle on SVHN, and 2.46% on
CIFAR10. The variance of MixMatch is slightly higher than
that of fully supervised training, but is much smaller than the
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Architecture Data Fraction ImageNet WSL WSL-5 ImageNet + Rot WSL + Rot WSL-5 + Rot
Resnet v2 50 10% (81.86/82.95) (82.71/84.18) (82.97/84.52) (82.27/84.14) (82.76/84.73) (82.84/84.59)
Resnet v2 200 10% (83.50/84.96) (84.81/86.36) (85.00/86.67) (85.10/86.29) (86.17/88.16) (86.11/87.54)
Resnet v2 50 100% (92.45/93.93) (93.00/94.64) (93.12/94.87) N/A N/A N/A
Resnet v2 200 100% (93.70/95.11) (94.26/96.24) (94.21/95.85) N/A N/A N/A
TABLE II
EXTRACTION ATTACK (TOP-5 ACCURACY/TOP-5 FIDELITY) OF THE WSL MODEL, WHICH WAS TRAINED ON 1 BILLION IMAGES [28]. EACH ROW
CORRESPONDS TO A PAIR OF ARCHITECTURE AND FRACTION OF PUBLIC IMAGENET DATA USED BY THE ADVERSARY TO TRAIN THE MODEL USING
LABELS FROM THE WSL ORACLE. IMAGENET COLUMN REFERS TO USING ONLY IMAGENET LABELS—THIS IS A BASELINE. WSL REFERS TO AN ORACLE
RETURNING PROBABILITIES OF THE WSL MODEL. WSL-5 REFERS TO AN ORACLE THAT ONLY RETURNS THE TOP 5 PROBABILITIES. COLUMNS WITH (+
ROT) REFER TO AN ADVERSARY WHO LEVERAGES UNLABELED TRAINING DATA WITH THE ROTATION LOSS [33, 34]. ROTATION LOSS WAS NOT RUN ON
100% OF TRAINING DATA BECAUSE ALL DATA IS LABELED. AN ADVERSARY ABLE TO QUERY WSL ALWAYS IMPROVES OVER IMAGENET LABELS, EVEN
WITH ACCESS TO THE TOP 5 PROBABILITIES ONLY. ROTATION LOSS DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE ON RESNET V2 50, BUT
PROVIDES A (1.36/1.80) IMPROVEMENT FOR RESNET V2 200, WHICH IS COMPARABLE TO THE PERFORMANCE BOOST GIVEN BY WSL LABELS ON
10% DATA. THERE IS STILL BENEFIT IN THE HIGH-DATA REGIME, WHERE WE OBSERVE A (0.56/1.13) IMPROVEMENT USING WSL LABELS.
Dataset Algorithm 250 Queries 1000 Queries 4000 Queries
SVHN FS (79.25/79.48) (89.47/89.87) (94.25/94.71)
SVHN MM (95.82/96.38) (96.87/97.45) (97.07/97.61)
CIFAR10 FS (53.35/53.61) (73.47/73.96) (86.51/87.37)
CIFAR10 MM (87.98/88.79) (90.63/91.39) (93.29/93.99)
TABLE III
EXTRACTION ATTACK PERFORMANCE (ACCURACY/FIDELITY) OF FULLY
SUPERVISED (FS) AND MIXMATCH (MM) EXTRACTION ON SVHN AND
CIFAR10. THE SVHN ORACLE REACHES ACCURACY OF 97.36%, AND
THE CIFAR10 ORACLE REACHES 95.75% ACCURACY. NOTE THAT THE
BEST ACCURACY AND FIDELITY ACHIEVED BY MIXMATCH IS VERY
CLOSE TO THE ORACLE’S PERFORMANCE FOR BOTH DATASETS, AND
MIXMATCH AT 250 QUERIES BEATS FULLY SUPERVISED TRAINING AT
4000 QUERIES FOR BOTH DATASETS. RESULTS ARE AVERAGED OVER 5
DIFFERENT SPLITS FOR SELECTING THE DATA QUERIED.
performance gap. These gains come from the prior MixMatch
is able to build using the unlabeled data, making it effective
at exploiting few labels.
C. Fidelity of learning-based extracted models
We now turn to reconnaissance, where achieving high
fidelity enables the adversary to mount attacks that rely on
the extracted model making similar mistakes to the oracle.
We consider here the label agreement with the oracle on test
data.
Those improvements in accuracy from semi-supervised
learning are mirrored in fidelity as well, even though no
extra information about the oracle is gained when lever-
aging unlabeled data. When using oracle labels, the top-1
fidelity increases by 1.62% for ResNet v2 50, and by 2.55%
for ResNet v2 200 when querying only 10% of the data.
Using rotation loss increases this advantage to 2.07% for
ResNet v2 50 and 4.41% for ResNet v2 200. Interestingly,
these gains are larger than those observed for accuracy—
we expect that improved semi-supervised learning techniques
would continue to reap fidelity gains on ImageNet models.
Fidelity also improves for the smaller datasets when using
MixMatch—the smallest difference is 2.9% at 4000 queries on
SVHN, and the largest is a gap of a full 25.18% on CIFAR10
at 250 queries. Again, the unlabeled data allows MixMatch to
build a strong prior to improve fidelity with.
V. LIMITATIONS OF LEARNING-BASED EXTRACTION
Learning-based approaches have several sources of non-
determinism—the random initializations of the model param-
eters, the order in which data is assembled to form batches
for SGD, and even the non-determinism in GPU instruc-
tions [40, 41]. These sources of non-determinism impact the
model parameter values obtained upon completion of training.
This implies that even if the adversary had full access to
the oracle’s training data, hyperparameters, etc., they would
still need to be able to reconstruct all of the learner’s non-
determinism in order to achieve perfect fidelity needed for the
functionally equivalent extraction goal described in Section III.
We perform the following experiment. Initially query an
oracle to obtain a labeled substitute dataset D. Use this dataset
for a learning-based extraction attack, producing a model
f1θ (x). Then, run the learning-based attack a second time
using the same substitute dataset, but different sources of non-
determinism to obtain a new set of parameters f2θ (x). If there
are points x such that f1θ (x) 6= f2θ (x), then the prediction on x
is dependent not on the oracle, but on the non-determinism of
the learning-based attack strategy—we are unable to guarantee
fidelity.
We independently control the initialization randomness and
batch randomness during training on Fashion-MNIST [42]
with fully supervised SGD (we use Fashion-MNIST for
training speed). We repeated each run 5 times and measure
agreement between the five obtained models on the test set.
Even when both training and initialization randomness are
fixed (so that GPU non-determinism is the only source of
randomness) fidelity peaks at 95%. With no randomness fixed,
we achieve at worst 92% fidelity on the test set. (These 5%
and 8% percent disagreements in fidelity should be taken in
the context of the base accuracy of 90% test accuracy.) Hence,
even an adversary who has the victim model’s exact training
set will be unable to exceed 92% fidelity. We explore this
phenomenon further in Figure 2. Using prototypicality metrics,
as investigated in Carlini et al. [43], we notice that those
points where fidelity is easiest to achieve are also the most
prototypical (i.e., more representative of the class it is labeled
as). This connection is explored further in Appendix C.
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Fig. 2. Agreement between networks trained with different random initial-
izations and training randomness. Five random weight initializations and five
random seeds for SGD randomness were used, with five trials done at each
pair. Pairs are arranged on the x and y axes first by SGD randomness, then
by initialization randomness. Naturally, the diagonal (where all randomness is
fixed) has the most agreement, but it is still only on at most 95.6% of points
due to nondeterminism in various GPU instructions. The diagonals in each 5x5
block are brighter than the rest of the blocks—this indicates the importance
of random initialization. Finally, some 5x5 blocks around the main diagonal
are brighter than others, indicating that SGD randomness has some effect,
but less so than the initialization (this is likely because GPU training already
introduces a significant source of disagreement during optimization).
It follows from these arguments that non-determinism of
both the victim and extracted model’s learning procedures
potentially compound, limiting the effectiveness of using a
learning-based approach to reaching high fidelity.
VI. FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT EXTRACTION
Having identified fundamental limitations that prevent
learning-based approaches from perfectly matching the ora-
cle’s mistakes, we now turn to a different approach where the
adversary extracts the oracle’s weights directly.
This attack can be seen as an extension of two prior works.
• Milli et al. [19] introduce an attack to extract neural
network weights under the assumption that the adversary
is able to make gradient queries. That is, each query
the adversary makes reveals not only the prediction of
the neural network, but also the gradient of the neural
network at that query point. To the best of our knowledge
this is the only functionally-equivalent extraction attack
on neural networks with one hidden layer, although it was
not actually implemented in practice.
• Batina et al. [25] introduce a side-channel attack that
extracts neural network weights through monitoring the
power use of a microprocessor evaluating the neural
network. This is a much more powerful threat model
than made by any of the other model extraction papers.
To the best of our knowledge this is the only practical
Symbol Definition
d Input dimensionality
h Hidden layer dimensionality (h < d)
K Number of classes
A(0) ∈ Rd×h Input layer weights
B(0) ∈ Rh Input layer bias
A(1) ∈ Rh×K Logit layer weights
B(1) ∈ RK Logit layer bias
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS FOR THE FUNCTIONALLY-EQUIVALENT ATTACK.
direct model extraction result—they manage to extract
essentially arbitrary depth networks.
In this section we introduce an attack which only requires
standard queries (i.e., that return the model’s prediction in-
stead of its gradients) and does not require any side-channel
leakages, yet still manages to achieve higher fidelity extraction
than the side-channel extraction work for two-layer networks,
assuming double-precision inference.
a) Attack Algorithm Intuition.: As in [19], our attack is
tailored to work on neural networks with the ReLU activation
function (the ReLU is an effective default choice of activation
function [20]). This makes the neural network a piecewise
linear function. Two samples are within the same linear region
if all of the ReLU units have the same sign. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.
By computing the difference between adjacent hyperplanes,
so that exactly one ReLU unit has flipped signs, it is possible
to almost completely determine the weight vector going into
that ReLU unit. By repeating this attack for all ReLU units we
can therefore recover the first weight matrix completely. (We
say almost here, because we must do some work to recover the
sign of the weight vector.) Once the first layer of the two-layer
neural network has been determined, the second layer can be
uniquely solved for algebraically through least squares. This
attack is optimal up to a constant factor—the query complexity
is discussed in Appendix E.
A. Notation and Assumptions
As in [19], we only aim to extract neural networks with one
hidden layer using the ReLU activation function. We denote
the model weights by A(0) ∈ Rd×h, A(1) ∈ Rh×K and biases
by B(0) ∈ Rh, B(1) ∈ RK . Here, d, h, and K respectively
refer to the input dimensionality, the size of the hidden layer,
and the number of classes. This is found in Table VI-A.
We say that ReLU(x) is at a critical point if x = 0; this is
the location at which the units gradient changes from 0 to 1.
We assume the adversary is able to observe the raw logit
outputs as 64-bit floating point values. We will use the notation
OL to denote the logit oracle. Our attack implicitly assumes
that the rows of A(0) are linearly independent. Because the
dimensional of the input space is larger than the hidden space
by at least 100, it is exceedingly unlikely for the rows to be
linearly dependent (and we find this holds true in practice).
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Fig. 3. 2-dimension intuition for the functionally equivalent extraction attack.
We remark that our attack is not an SQ algorithm, which
would require us to only look at aggregate statistics of our
dataset: instead, we require highly local analysis of the net-
work. This algorithmic structure, and the preceding assump-
tions, allow us to avoid the pathologies of Section III-C1.
B. Attack Overview
The algorithm is broken into four phases:
• Critical point search identifies inputs {xi}ni=1 to the
neural network so that exactly one of the ReLU units is
at a critical point (i.e., has input identically 0).
• Weight recovery takes an input x which causes the
ith neuron to be at a critical point. We use this point
x to compute the difference between the two adjacent
hyperplanes induced by the critical point, and thus the
weight vector row A(0)i . By repeating this process for
each ReLU we obtain the complete matrix A(0). Due to
technical reasons discussed below, we can only recover
the row-vector up to sign.
• Sign recovery determines the sign of each row-vector
A
(0)
j for all j using global information about the complete
weight matrix A(0).
• Final layer extraction uses algebraic techniques (e.g.,
least squares) to solve for the second layer of the network.
C. Critical Point Search
For a two layer network, observe that the logit function is
given by the equation OL(x) = A(1)ReLU(A(0)x + B(0)) +
B(1). To find a critical point for every ReLU, we sample two
random vectors u, v ∈ Rd, and consider the function
L(t;u, v,OL) = OL(u+ tv).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
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2.6
/
t
O L
(u
+
tv
)
Fig. 4. An example sweep for critical point search. Here we plot the partial
derivative across t and see that OL(u + tv) is piecewise linear, enabling a
binary search.
for t varying between a small and large appropriately selected
value (discussed below). L(·) is a piecewise linear function,
and that the points t where L(t) is non-differentiable are
exactly locations where some ReLUi is changing signs (i.e.,
some ReLU is at a critical point). Figure 4 shows an example
of what this sweep looks like on a trained MNIST model.
Furthermore, notice that given a pair u, v, there is exactly
one value t for which each ReLU is at a critical point, and if t
is allowed to grow arbitrarily large or small that every ReLU
unit will switch sign exactly once. Intuitively, the reason this
is true is that each ReLU’s input is either a monotonically
increasing or decreasing function of t. Thus, by varying t, we
can identify an input xi that sets the ith ReLU to 0 for every
relu i in the network. This assumes we are not moving parallel
to any of the rows, and that we vary t within a sufficiently large
interval. The analysis of [19] suggests that these concerns can
be resolved with high probability by varying t ∈ [−h2, h2].
While in theory it would be possible to sweep all values
of t to identify the critical points, this would require a large
number of queries. Thus, to efficiently search for the locations
of critical points, we introduce a refined search algorithm
which improves on the binary search as used in [19]. Standard
binary search requires O(n) model queries to obtain n bits of
precision. Therefore, we propose a refined technique which
does not have this restriction and requires just O(1) queries
to obtain high (20+ bits) precision. The key observation we
make is that if we are searching between two values [t1, t2]
and there is exactly one discontinuity in this range, we can
precisely identify the location of that discontinuity efficiently.
The property this leverages is that the function is piecewise
linear - if we know the range is composed of two linear
segments, we can compute where they intersect. An intuitive
diagram for this algorithm can be found in Figure 5 and the
algorithm can be found in Algorithm 1.
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D. Weight Recovery
After running critical point search we obtain a set {xi}hi=1,
where each critical point corresponds to a point where a single
ReLU flips sign. In order to use this information to learn
the weight matrix A(0) we measure the second derivative
of OL in each input direction at the points xi. Taking the
second derivative here corresponds to measuring the difference
between the linear regions on either side of the ReLU. Recall
that prior work assumed direct access to gradient queries, and
thus did not require any of the analysis in this section.
1) Absolute Value Recovery: To formalize the intuition of
comparing adjacent hyperplanes, observe that for the oracle
OL and for a critical point xi (corresponding to ReLUi being
zero) and for a random input-space direction ej we have
∂2OL
∂e2j
∣∣∣∣∣
xi
=
∂OL
∂ej
∣∣∣∣
xi+c·ej
− ∂OL
∂ej
∣∣∣∣
xi−c·ej
=
∑
k
A
(1)
k 1(A
(0)
k (xi + c · ej) +B(0)k > 0)A(0)kj
−
∑
k
A
(1)
k 1(A
(0)
k (xi − c · ej) +B(0)k > 0)A(0)kj
= A
(1)
i
(
1(A
(0)
i · ej > 0)− 1(−A(0)i · ej > 0)
)
A
(0)
ji
= ±(A(0)ji A(1)i )
for a c > 0 small enough so that xi ± c · ej does not flip
any other ReLU. Because xi is a critical point and c is small,
the sums in the second line differ only in the contribution of
ReLUi. We’ve only recovered a product involving both weight
matrices. Let’s see how we can use this information.
If we compute |A(0)1i A(1)| and |A(0)2i A(1)| by querying along
directions e1 and e2, we can divide these quantities to obtain
the value |A(0)1i /A(0)2i |, the ratio of the two weights. By repeat-
ing the above process for each input direction we can, for all
k, obtain the pairwise ratios |A(0)1i /A(0)ki |.
Recall from Section III that obtaining the ratios of weights
is the theoretically optimal result we could hope to achieve. It
is always possible to multiply all of the weights into a ReLU
by a constant c > 0 and then multiply all of the weights out
of the ReLU by c−1. Thus, without loss of generality, we can
assign A(0)1i = 1 and scale the remaining entries accordingly.
Unfortunately, we have lost a small amount of information
here. We have only learned the absolute value of the ratio,
and not the value itself.
2) Weight Sign Recovery: Once we reconstruct the values
|A(0)ji /A(0)1i | for all j we need to recover the sign of these
values. To do this we consider the following quantity:
∂2OL
∂(ej + ek)2
∣∣∣∣
xi
= ±(A(0)ji A(1)i ±A(0)ki A(1)i ).
That is, we consider what would happen if we take the second
partial derivative in the direction (ej+ek). Their contributions
to the gradient will either cancel out, indicating A0)ji and A
(0)
ki
are of opposite sign, or they will compound on each other,
indicating they have the same sign. Thus, to recover signs, we
can perform this comparison along each direction (e1 + ej).
Here we encounter one final difficulty. There are a total
of n signs we need to recover, but because we compute the
signs by comparing ratios along different directions, we can
only obtain n− 1 relations. That is, we now know the correct
signed value of A(0)i up to a single sign for the entire row.
It turns out this is to be expected. What we have computed is
the normal direction to the hyperplane, but because any given
hyperplane can be described by an infinite number of normal
vectors differing by a constant scalar, we can not hope to use
local information to recover this final sign bit.
Put differently, while it is possible to push a constant c >
0 through from the first layer to the second layer, it is not
possible to do this for negative constants, because the ReLU
function is not symmetric. Therefore, it is necessary to learn
the sign of this row.
E. Global Sign Recovery
Once we have recovered the input vector’s weights, we still
don’t know the sign for the given inputs - we only measure the
difference between linear functions at each critical point, but
do not know which side is the positive side of the ReLU [19].
Now, we need to leverage global information in order to
reconcile all of inputs’ signs.
Notice that recovering Aˆ(0)i allows us to obtain B
(0)
i by
using the fact that A(0)i ·xi+B(0)i = 0. Then we can compute
Bˆ
(0)
i up to the same global sign as is applied to Aˆ
(0)
i .
To begin we search for a vector z that is in the null space
of Aˆ(0), that is, Aˆ(0)z = ~0. Because the neural network has
h < d, the null-space is non-zero, and we can find many such
vectors through least squares. Then, for each ReLUi we search
for a vector vi such that viA(0) = ei where here ei is the ith
basis vector in the hidden space. That is, moving along the
vi direction only changes ReLUi’s input value. Again we can
search for this through least squares.
Given z and these vi we query the neural network for the
values of OL(z), OL(z+vi), and OL(z−vi). On each of these
three queries, all hidden units are 0 except for ReLUi which
recieves as input either 0, 1, or −1 by the construction of vi.
However, notice that the output of ReLUi can only be either
0 or 1, and the two {−1, 0} cases collapse to just output 0.
Therefore, if OL(z+vi) = OL(z), we know that A(0)i ·vi < 0.
Otherwise, we know OL(z − vi) = OL(z) and A(0)i · vi > 0.
This allows us to recover the sign bit for ReLUi.
F. Last Layer Extraction
Once we have fully specified the function to compute the
first hidden layer, the logit function of the network is just a
linear transformation which we can recover with least squares,
through making h queries where each ReLU is active at least
once. In practice, we use the critical points discovered in the
previous section so that we do not need to make additional
neural network queries.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for 2-linearity testing. Computes the
location of the only critical point in a given range or rejects
if there is more than one.
Function f , range [t1, t2], 
m1 =
f(t1+)−f(t1)
 . Gradient at t1
m2 =
f(t2)−f(t2−)
 . Gradient at t2
y1 = f(a), y2 = f(b)
x = a+ y2−y1−(b−a)m2m1−m2 . Candidate critical point
yˆ = y1 +m1
y2−y1−(b−a)m2
m1−m2 . Function value at candidate
y = f(x) . True value at candidate
if yˆ = y then return x
else return ”More than one critical point”
end if
t1 x t2 t1 x t2
O(x) = exp. Oˆ(x) exp. Oˆ(x)
O(x)
Fig. 5. Efficient and accurate 2-linear testing subroutine in Algorithm 1.
Left shows a successful case where the algorithm succeeds; right shows a
potential failure case, where there are multiple nonlinearities. We detect this
by observing the expected value of O(x) is not the observed (queried) value.
G. Results
Setup. We train several one-layer fully-connected neural
networks with between 16 and 512 hidden units (for twelve
thousand and a hundred thousand trainable parameters, respec-
tively) on the MNIST [44] and CIFAR-10 datasets [39]. We
train the models with the Adam [23] optimizer for 20 epochs
at batch size 128 until they converge. We train five networks
of each size to obtain higher statistical significance.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Hidden Size Accuracy Hidden Size Accuracy
16 94.3% 16 29.2%
32 95.6% 32 34.2%
64 97.2% 64 40.3%
128 97.7% 128 42.6%
512 98.3% 512 45.9%
TABLE V
STATISTICS FOR THE ORACLE MODELS WE TRAIN TO EXTRACT.
MNIST Extraction. We implement the functionally-
equivalent extraction attack in JAX [45] and run it on each
trained oracle. We evaluate the fidelity of the extracted model
(by comparing the predictions to the oracle’s predictions) on
both the standard MNIST test dataset X as well as perturbed
test sets
Xσ = {x+N (0, Iσ2) : x ∈ X
where I is the 784 × 784 identity matrix. That is, Xσ adds
Gaussian noise component-wise (to each pixel) of each image
in the test set.
Results are summarized in Table VI. For the small network
sizes, we achieve perfect fidelity, even on samples that have
been perturbed by a large amount of noise. (We normalize all
inputs x ∈ [0, 1]784, so adding Gaussian noise with standard
deviation 1.0 is enormous: the noise is now larger than the
signal.) As the network size increases, the low-probability
errors we encounter begin to increase in frequency. The
extracted neural network still (almost) perfectly matches the
original neural network on normal test data, but on randomly
modified test examples it begins to disagree. We manage to
reconstruct the first weight matrix to an average precision of
23 bits - we provide more results in Appendix D.
CIFAR-10 Extraction. The results for the CIFAR-10 model
are nearly identical to the MNIST model. We achieve 100%
test set agreement on models sized 16-64 and greater than 99%
test set agreement on the models of size 128 and 512.
Comparison to Prior Work. To the best of our knowledge,
this is by orders of magnitude the highest fidelity extraction
of neural network weights.
The only fully-implemented neural network extraction at-
tack we are aware of is the work of Batina et al. [25]
who uses an electromagnetic side channels and differential
power analysis to recover an MNIST neural network with
neural network weights with an average error of 0.0025. In
comparison, we are able to achieve an average error in the
first weight matrix for a similarly sized neural network of
just 0.0000009—over two thousand times more precise. To
the best of our knowledge no functionally-equivalent CIFAR-
10 models have been extracted in the past.
We are unable to make a comparison between the fidelity of
our extraction attack and the fidelity of the attack presented in
Batina et al. because they do not report on this number: they
only report the accuracy of the extracted model and show it
is similar to the original model. (We believe this strengthens
our observation that comparing across accuracy and fidelity is
not currently widely accepted as best practice.)
Investigating Errors. We observe that as the number of
parameters that must be extracted increases, the fidelity of
the model decreases. We investigate why this happens and
discovered that a small fraction of the time (roughly 1 in
10,000) the gradient estimation procedure obtains an incorrect
estimate of the gradient and therefore one of the extracted
weights Aˆ(0)ij is incorrect by a non-insignificant margin.
Introducing an error into just one of the weights of the first
matrix should not induce significant further errors. However,
because of this error, when we solve for the bias vector, the
extracted bias Bˆ(0)i will have error proportional to the error of
Aˆ
(0)
ij . And when the bias is wrong, it impacts every calculation.
Resolving this issue completely either requires reducing
the failure rate of gradient estimation from 1 in 10,000
to practically 0, or would require a complex error-recovery
procedure. Instead, we will introduce in the following section
an improvement which almost completely solves this issue.
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Number of Fidelity on Fidelity on Test Data plus N (0, Iσ2)
Parameters Test Data σ = .1 σ = .25 σ = .5 σ = 1.0
16 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
32 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.78%
64 100% 100% 99.96% 99.47% 92.69%
128 99.98% 99.98% 99.97% 97.51% 80.69%
TABLE VI
FIDELITY OF THE FUNCTIONALLY-EQUIVALENT EXTRACTION ATTACK
ACROSS DIFFERENT TEST DISTRIBUTIONS ON AN MNIST VICTIM MODEL.
RESULTS ARE AVERAGED OVER FIVE EXTRACTION ATTACKS. FOR SMALL
MODELS, WE ACHIEVE PERFECT FIDELITY EXTRACTION; LARGER MODELS
HAVE NEAR-PERFECT FIDELITY ON THE TEST DATA DISTRIBUTION, BUT
ON NOISY DISTRIBUTIONS HAVE LOWER FIDELITY. COMPARE TO
TABLE VII FOR AN IMPROVED VERSION OF THIS ATTACK WHICH ALSO
ACHIEVES NEAR-PERFECT FIDELITY ON LARGE NETWORKS.
VII. HYBRID STRATEGIES
Until now the strategies we have developed for extraction
have been pure and focused entirely on learning or entirely
on direct extraction. We now show that there is a continuous
spectrum from which we can draw attack strategies, and these
hybrid strategies can leverage both the query efficiency of
learning extraction, and the fidelity of direct extraction.
A. Learning-Based Extraction with Gradient Matching
Milli et al. demonstrate that gradient matching is an ef-
fective way to leverage model explanations. Their approach
optimizes the following objective:
n∑
i=1
H(O(xi), f(xi)) + α|∇xO(xi)−∇xf(xi)|22,
assuming the adversary can query the model for∇xO(x). This
is more model access than we permit our adversary, but is an
example of using intuition from direct recovery to improve
extraction. We found in preliminary experiments that this
technique can improve fidelity on small datasets (increasing
fidelity from 95% to 96.5% on Fashion-MNIST), but we
leave scaling and removing the model access assumption of
this technique to future work. This is not the only way that
learning and direct recovery can be combined. We show next
how learning can help alleviate some of the limitations of the
previous functionally-equivalent extraction attack.
B. Functionally-Equivalent Error Recovery through Learning
Recall from earlier that the functionally-equivalent extrac-
tion attack fidelity degrades as the model size increases. This
is a result of low-probability errors in the first weight matrix
inducing incorrect biases on the first layer, which in turn
propagates and causes worse errors in the second layer.
We now introduce a method for performing a learning-
based error recovery routine. While performing a fully-
learning-based attack leaves too many free variables so that
functionally-equivalent extraction is not possible, if we fix
many of the variables to the values extracted through the
direct recovery attack, we now show it is possible to learn
the remainder of the variables.
Number of Fidelity on Fidelity on Test Data plus N (0, Iσ2)
Parameters Test Data σ = .1 σ = .25 σ = .5 σ = 1.0
16 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
32 100% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.85%
64 100% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.79%
128 100% 100% 100% 99.94% 99.76%
512 99.31% 99.22% 98.01% 93.08% 86.37%
TABLE VII
FIDELITY OF EXTRACTED MNIST MODEL WITH HYBRID STRATEGY,
COMPARE TO TABLE VI. ERROR RATES ARE REDUCED BY ORDERS OF
MAGNITUDE ON HIGHLY OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION DATA. NOTE THE LAST
ROW IS NOT PRESENT IN THE PRIOR TABLE.
Formally, let Aˆ(0) be the extracted weight matrix for the first
layer and Bˆ(0) be the extracted bias vector for the first layer.
Previously, we used least squares to directly solve for Aˆ(1)
and Bˆ(1) assuming we had extracted the first layer perfectly.
Here, we relax this assumption. Instead, we perform gradient
descent optimizing for parameters W0..2 that minimize
Ex∈D
∥∥fθ(x)−W1ReLU(Aˆ(0)x+ Bˆ(0) +W0) +W2∥∥
.
That is, we use a single trainable parameter to adjust the bias
term of the first layer, and then solve (via gradient descent with
training data) for the remaining weight matrix accordingly.
This hybrid strategy increases the fidelity of the extracted
model substantially, detailed in Table VII. In the worst-
performing example from earlier (with only direct extraction)
the extracted 128-neuron network had 80% fidelity agreement
with the victim model. When performing learning-based re-
covery, the fidelity agreement jumps all the way to 99.75%.
VIII. DEFENDING AGAINST MODEL EXTRACTION
There is a fundamental tension between providing useful
queries and preventing model extraction. Preventing model
extraction requires decreasing the quality of the queries, but
decreasing the quality of the queries too much impacts the
benign user, reducing their incentive to use the model. Then
there are two potential avenues for protecting against model
extraction—limiting the information the adversary learns, and
differentiating a benign user from a model extraction attack.
A. Information per Dollar
While completely preventing model extraction is infeasible,
it may be possible to increase the cost of model extraction to a
level comparable to the cost of data labeling, while balancing
this with potential harm to legitimate users. The first approach
to protection is to limit the amount of information an adversary
learns about the model with some fixed cost. Several existing
proposals in the literature use this approach. Perturbing (or
rounding/adding noise to) class probabilities [11, 13, 46], re-
leasing probabilities only for high probability classes [11], and
releasing only class outputs [11, 13] have all been proposed
as countermeasures. One can also sample from a distribution
over model parameters [13, 47]. These approaches have not
been shown to defeat model extraction, but they may force an
adversary to make more queries.
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In our work, the strategies presented in Sections IV and
VI both assume that the adversary is able to observe the
full prediction vector. Extending the functionally equivalent
attack of Section VI to work with more limited information
would be nontrivial—we leave this to future work. However,
in Table II, we report the resilience of our learning-based
extraction attack on ImageNet to only receiving probabilities
for the top-5 classes. With 10% of the training data, we
find only receiving top-5 labels does not significantly impact
the attack’s performance—ResNet v2 50 actually improves
by 0.31% over the full prediction vector, and ResNet v2 200
improves by 0.19%, although the improvement from rotation
loss does decrease by 0.25%. The results are only slightly
changed by removing access, and sometimes improve, which
could be the result of the model being more ”focused” on
the top-5 predictions. We discuss the top-1 performance in
Appendix B, where performance drops 1.19% in one case.
All results are similar for fidelity.
If an adversary is forced to make more queries, it is possible
for the model owner to simultaneously increase the cost of
a query to thwart the adversary’s economic incentives. Prior
work [13] has investigated the monetary cost of running
their extraction attacks—this could lead to interesting anal-
ysis relating to adversarial objectives. For a theft-motivated
adversary, the economic point of comparison would be with
a human labeler. For example, the Google Cloud Vision API
charges $1.50 per 1000 model queries; Google Cloud also
offers dataset labeling services at $35 per 1000 labels—a
theft-motivated adversary’s incentives point clearly to model
extraction. For a reconnaissance-motivated adversary, the cost
of the attack must be weighed with the economic benefit—
for an adversary attempting to evade a spam classifier, their
economic benefit is the expected value of the spam.
B. Differentiating Users
Another approach would be to differentiate a benign user
from a malicious user who is attempting model extraction. If
this is possible, it puts the model owner in a better economic
position—they can offer better per-query prices if they know
the user is not attempting an extraction attack. Two possible
approaches are to analyze query patterns [48, 49] or use an
independent authentication channel.
Looking only at query patterns is a limited approach. Given
only query patterns, a nonadaptive model extraction attack (for
example, equation solving or nonadaptive MixMatch training)
cannot be distinguished from a benign user; however, this
forces the adversary to be nonadaptive, which increases their
query requirement. Even an adaptive attack (such as the attack
from Section VI or an active learning based approach) could
be distributed among users in a Sybil attack—this would be
hard to detect, but would require the investment of account
generation for the Sybils.
The other possibility is some independent authentication
channel—for example, a contract between the model owner
and the user. We mention this only for completeness, as this
is a highly domain-dependent solution.
IX. RELATED WORK
We presented existing approaches to model extraction in
Table I, and defenses in Section VIII.
Most prior work into model extraction has used learning-
based techniques. This includes nonadaptive techniques [11,
12, 16] as well as adaptive techniques using various forms
of active learning [7, 11–13, 15, 50]. Work that has opted
for direct recovery instead has been developed for decision
trees [11], linear models [8, 11], and has been theoretically
proposed for two-layer neural networks [19]. Alternative threat
models have been proposed for model extraction using model
explanations [19] or side channel attacks [25], both of which
our work builds off of.
It is also possible to query a model to steal hyperparam-
eters [51] or architectural information [14]. An adversary
that can use side channel attacks can do the same [18, 25].
These are orthogonal to our work, but compatible with it—
information about a model, such as assumptions we made in
Section VI, empowers an adversary to perform extraction.
Our work is also related to the field of knowledge transfer,
which builds small models with comparable performance to
cumbersome models (e.g., large ensembles). This includes
techniques such as distillation [24] and model compres-
sion [52]. Zero shot knowledge transfer [29] has been proposed
to transfer knowledge without assumptions on training data.
Watermarking neural networks has been proposed [53, 54]
to identify model extraction after-the-fact. Model extraction
calls into question the utility of cryptographic protocols used to
protect model weights. One such approach (which has not been
realized) is obfuscation [55], where an equivalent program
could be released and queried as many times as desired. A
more realizable approach is secure multiparty computation,
where the model owner and querying party run a protocol for
each query to the model [56].
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we characterized and explored the space of
model extraction attacks on neural networks.
Our learning-based methods can effectively attack a model
with several millions of parameters trained on a billion images,
and allows the attacker to reduce the error rate of their model
by 10%. This attack does not match perfect fidelity with the
victim model due to what we show are inherent limitations
of learning-based approaches: even when controlling for all
software-controllable randomness, randomness on the GPU
itself prohibits training identical models. In contrast, our direct
functionally-equivalent extraction returns a neural network
agreeing with the victim model on 100% of the test samples.
We then propose a hybrid method which unifies these
two attacks, using learning-based approaches to recover from
numerical instability errors when performing the functionally-
equivalent extraction attack.
We believe that our work highlights many remaining open
problems in model stealing, such as easing some of the
adversarial capabilities required by our attacks and scaling
functionally-equivalent extraction.
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APPENDIX A
FORMAL STATEMENTS FOR SECTION III-C
Here, we give the formal arguments for the difficulty of
model extraction to support the informal statements made in
Section III-C.
Theorem 1. There exists a class of width 3k and depth 2
neural networks on domain [0, 1]d with d ≥ k that require
256k queries to extract.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we introduce a family of
functions we call k-rectangle bounded functions, which we
will show satisfies this property.
Definition A.1. A function f on domain [0, 1]d with range
R is called a rectangle bounded function if there exists two
vectors a, b such that f(x) 6= 0 =⇒ a  x  b. We use 
to denote element-wise comparison. The function f is called
a k-rectangle bounded function if there are k indices i such
that ai 6= 0 or bi 6= 1.
Intuitively, a k-rectangle function only outputs a non-zero
value on a multidimensional rectangle that is constrained
in only k coordinates. We begin by showing that we can
implement k-rectangle functions for any a, b using a ReLU
network of width k and depth 2.
Lemma 1. For any a, b with k indices i such that ai 6= 0 or
bi 6= 1, we can construct a k-rectangle bounded function for
a, b with a ReLU network of width 3k and depth 2.
Proof. We will start by constructing a 3-ReLU gadget with
output ≥ 1 only when ai ≤ xi ≤ bi. We will then show
how to compose k of these gadgets, one for each index of
the k-rectangle, in order to construct the k-rectangle bounded
function.
The 3-ReLU gadget only depends on xi, so weights for
all other ReLUs will be set to 0. Observe that the function
Ti(x; a, b) = ReLU(x − a) + ReLU(xi − bi) − 2ReLU(xi −
(ai + bi)/2) is nonzero only on the interval (ai, bi). This is
easier to see when it is written as
ReLU(xi − ai)− ReLU(xi − (ai + bi)/2)
− (ReLU(xi − (ai + bi)/2)− ReLU(xi − bi)).
The function ReLU(x − x1) − ReLU(x − x2) with x1 < x2
looks like a sigmoid, and has the following form:
ReLU(x− x1)− ReLU(x− x2) =

0 x ≤ x1
x− x1 x1 ≤ x ≤ x2
x2 − x1 x ≥ x
Now, Ti(x; ai, bi) ·1/(bi−ai) has range [0, 1] for any value
of ai, bi. Then the function
fa,b(x) = ReLU(
∑
i
(Ti(x; ai, bi)/(bi − ai))− (k − 1))
is k-rectangle bounded for vectors a, b. To see why, we
need that no input x not satisfying a  x  b has∑
i(Ti(x; ai, bi)/(bi − ai)) > k − 1. This is simply because
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each term Ti(x; ai, bi) ≤ 1, so unless all k such terms are
> 0, the inequality cannot hold.
Now that we know how to construct a k-rectangle bounded
function, we will introduce a set of 256k disjoint k-rectangle
bounded functions, and then show that they any one requires
256k queries to extract when the others are in the set of
possible functions.
Lemma 2. There exists a family of k-rectangle bounded
functions F such that extracting an element of F requires
256k queries to extract in the worst case.
This theorem holds for any value of 256 - we chose this
number to reflect the standard setting of image classification
with 8-bit pixel values.
Proof. We begin by constructing F . The following 256 ranges
are clearly pairwise disjoint: {( i−1256 , i256 )}256i=1. Then pick k
indices arbitrarily, and we can construct 256k distinct k-
rectangle bounded functions - one for each element in the
Cartesian product of each index’s set of ranges. Call this set
F .
The set of inputs with non-zero output is distinct for each
function, because their rectangles are distinct. Now consider
the information gained from any query. If the query returns
a non-zero value, the function is learned. If not, at most one
function from F is ruled out - the function whose rectangle
was queried. Then any sequence of n queries to an oracle
can rule out at most n of the functions of F , so that at least
|F| = 256k queries are required in the worst case.
Putting these two statements together gives us Theorem 1.
Note that many other constructions are possible for an F
with the same qualitative statement - for example, constructing
disjoint simplices in k dimensions requires a width of only
k + 1.
Theorem 2. Checking whether two networks with domains
{0, 1}d are functionally equivalent is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove this by reduction to subset sum. A similar
reduction (reducing to 3-SAT instead of Subset Sum) for a
different statement appears in [57].
Suppose we receive a Subset Sum instance
T, p, [v1, v2, · · · , vd] - the set is v, the target sum is T ,
and the precision of the problem is p. We will construct
networks f1 and f2 such that checking if f1 and f2 are
functionally equivalent is equivalent to finding a solution
to subset sum or returning false. We can start by setting
f1 = 0 - it never returns a non-zero value. We will now
construct a network f2 that will have nonzero output only if
the subset sum instance can be solved (and finding an input
with nonzero output reveals the satisfying subset).
The network f2 will have three hidden units in the first
layer with incoming weight for the ith feature equal to vi.
This means the dot product of the input x with weights will
be the sum of the subset {i|xi = 1}. We want to force this to
accept iff there is an input where this sum is T . To do so, we
use the same 3-ReLU gadget as in the proof of Theorem 1:
f2(x;T, p, v) = ReLU(x · v − (T − p/2))
+ ReLU(x · v − (T + p/2))− 2ReLU(x · v − T ).
As before, this will only be nonzero in the range [T−p/2, T+
p/2], and we are done.
APPENDIX B
EXTENDED RESULTS FOR SECTION IV
Here, we present the extended results for ImageNet, con-
taining top-1 accuracy and fidelity for our attacks.
First, observe that using WSL labels improves both the top-1
accuracy and fidelity. For ResNet v2 50 with 10% of the data,
we see a gain of 1.02% for accuracy and 1.68% for fidelity
over using ImageNet labels. For ResNet v2 200 with 10% of
the data, the improvement is larger—1.88% for accuracy and
2.59% for fidelity.
Rotation loss is also effective for top-1 metrics. For
ResNet v2 50 with 10% of the data, accuracy improves by
0.26% and fidelity by 0.39% over only using WSL labels and
no unlabeled data. For ResNet v2 200, the improvement is
again larger—1.42% in accuracy and 1.82% in fidelity.
Top-1 is not only slightly impacted by an oracle that
only returns the top-5 predictions. For the rotation loss
trained ResNet v2 50 with 10% of the data, accuracy drops
by 0.18%, and fidelity by 0.14%. For rotation loss trained
ResNet v2 200, accuracy drops by 1.19% and fidelity by
1.29%—this is still better than receiving the full prediction
vector without using unlabeled data.
APPENDIX C
PROTOTYPICALITY AND FIDELITY
We know from Section V that learning strategies struggle
to achieve perfect fidelity due to the non-determinism inherent
in learning. What remains to be understood is whether some
samples are more difficult than others to achieve fidelity on.
We investigate through the lens of recent work on identifying
prototypical data points. Using each metric developed in
Carlini et al. [43], we can rank the Fashion-MNIST test set in
order of increasing prototypicality. Binning the prototypicality
ranking into percentiles, we can measure how many models
out of the 125 we trained for Section V agree on the same pre-
diction. The intuition here is that more prototypical examples
should be more consistently learnable, whereas more outlying
points may be harder to consistently classify. Indeed, we find
that this is the case - all metrics find a correlation between
prototypicality and model agreement (fidelity), as seen in
Figure 6. Interestingly, the metrics which do not use ensembles
of models (adversarial distance and holdout-retraining) have
the best correlation with the model agreement metric—roughly
the top 50% of prototypical examples by these metrics are
classified the same by nearly all 125 models.
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Model Fraction ImageNet WSL WSL-5 ImageNet + Rot WSL + Rot WSL-5 + Rot
Resnet v2 50 10% (58.66/60.98) (59.68/62.66) (60.45/63.6) (59.17/61.69) (60.04/63.05) (59.86/62.91)
Resnet v2 200 10% (61.17/63.81) (63.05/66.40) (62.79/66.36) (62.52/65.04) (64.47/68.22) (63.28/66.93)
Resnet v2 50 100% (75.26/78.87) (76.43/81.06) (76.28/81.06) N/A N/A N/A
Resnet v2 200 100% (77.56/81.19) (78.57/83.91) (78.24/83.2) N/A N/A N/A
TABLE VIII
EXTRACTION ATTACK (TOP-1 ACCURACY/TOP-1 FIDELITY) OF THE WSL IMAGENET MODEL BY MODEL AND SETTING. SEE TABLE II FOR
INSTRUCTIONS ON READING THIS TABLE. WSL PROBABILITIES ALWAYS IMPROVE OVER IMAGENET LABELS, EVEN WHEN ONLY THE TOP 5
PROBABILITIES ARE RETURNED. ROTATION PREDICTION LOSS DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE ON RESNET V2 50, BUT
PROVIDES A (1.42/1.82) IMPROVEMENT FOR RESNET V2 200, WHICH IS ACTUALLY LARGER THAN THE PERFORMANCE BOOST GIVEN BY WSL LABELS
ON 10% DATA. THERE IS STILL BENEFIT IN THE HIGH-DATA REGIME, WHERE WE OBSERVE A (1.17/2.19) IMPROVEMENT USING WSL LABELS.
Dataset Metric Algorithm 250 Queries 1000 Queries 4000 Queries
SVHN Accuracy Fully Supervised 79.25± 0.89 89.47± 0.28 94.25± 0.16
SVHN Accuracy MixMatch 95.82± 1.46 96.87± 0.03 97.07± 0.06
SVHN Fidelity Fully Supervised 79.48± 0.87 89.87± 0.25 94.71± 0.18
SVHN Fidelity MixMatch 96.38± 1.40 97.45± 0.04 97.61± 0.02
CIFAR10 Accuracy Fully Supervised 53.35± 0.19 73.47± 0.14 86.51± 0.08
CIFAR10 Accuracy MixMatch 87.98± 0.55 90.63± 0.41 93.29± 0.10
CIFAR10 Fidelity Fully Supervised 53.61± 0.17 73.96± 0.11 87.37± 0.09
CIFAR10 Fidelity MixMatch 88.79± 0.50 91.39± 0.39 93.99± 0.12
TABLE IX
EXTRACTION ATTACK PERFORMANCE OF FULLY SUPERVISED (FS) AND MIXMATCH (MM) EXTRACTION ON SVHN AND CIFAR10. THE SVHN
ORACLE REACHES ACCURACY OF 97.36%, AND THE CIFAR10 ORACLE REACHES 95.75% ACCURACY. NOTE THAT THE BEST ACCURACY AND FIDELITY
ACHIEVED BY MIXMATCH IS VERY CLOSE TO THE ORACLE’S PERFORMANCE FOR BOTH DATASETS. RESULTS ARE AVERAGED OVER 5 DIFFERENT SPLITS.
Fig. 6. It is easier to get fidelity on more prototypical examples. Using the
125 models we trained for understanding the impact of nondeterminism on
fidelity, we counted the number of models which agree on the prediction made
by their ensemble - the most predicted class. Then we bucket by percentiles
in a prototypicality ranking, and plot the mean number of agreeing models.
There is a positive correlation for every prototypicality metric considered,
which is strongest for the adversarial distance and holdout retraining.
APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS FOR SECTION VI
In this section, we present supplemental results for Sec-
tion VI. In Section VI, we measured the fidelity of our
extracted model on test data and randomly augmented test
data. Here, we provide two more metrics substantiating the
fidelity of the technique.
Figure 7 shows a distribution over the bits of precision in
the first weight matrix we extract on the 16-neuron neural
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Fig. 7. For a 16-neuron MNIST model the attack works. The weights of the
matrix are learned precisely. Plotted here is log2 |Wij − Wˆij |/|Wij | where
W is the true weight and Wˆ is the learned weight.
network. All weights are identical in the first 17 bits, with the
average identical on 23 bits.
Similarly, Figure 8 shows a distribution over the bits of
precision in the difference between the logits (i.e., pre-softmax
prediction) of the two networks. That is, formally, we measure
the magnitude of the gap |fθ(x)− fθˆ(x)|.
APPENDIX E
QUERY COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT
EXTRACTION
In this section, we briefly analyze the query complexity of
the attack presented in Section VI. We will assume that a
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Fig. 8. For a 16-neuron MNIST model the attack works. Plotted here is
number of bits of precision on the logits normalized by the value of the lot
as done in the prior figure.
simulated partial derivative requires O(1) queries using finite
differences.
1) Critical Point Search. This step is the most nontrivial to
analyze, but fortunately this was addressed in [19]. They
found this step requires O(h log(h)) gradient queries.
We can simulate this with O(h log(h)) model queries
with finite differences.
2) Weight Recovery. This piece is significantly complicated
by not having access to gradient queries. The absolute
value recovery requires O(d) queries per ReLU, weight
sign recovery requires an additional O(d), making this
step take O(dh) queries total.
3) Global Sign Recovery. For each ReLU, we require only
three queries. Then this step is O(h).
4) Last Layer Extraction. This step requires h queries to
make the system of linear equations completely deter-
mined.
Overall, we find this algorithm requires O(h log(h) + dh+
h). Because d > h, this is O(dh). Extraction requires Ω(dh)
queries without any auxillary information, as there are dh
parameters. Then this algorithm is query-optimal up to a
constant factor; this removes logarithmic factors that were
present in Milli et al. [19].
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